By John A. Warden III
In the past I have stressed the importance of thinking strategically before acting and have emphasized the idea that any strategy must address The Essence of Strategy-four critical questions based on single words:
- Where-do you intend to be at a time point in the future? (Future Picture)
- What-are you going to put your resources against? (Systems and Centers of Gravity)
- How-and in what time span are you going to apply your resources? (Parallel Attack)
- Exit-for every part of your plan? (Finish with Finesse)
In addition, it is imperative to decide in advance how you intend to behave (Guiding Precepts) and to commit to following smart strategy principles (Cardinal Rules). One of these Cardinal Rules especially important to follow in geopolitical strategy development is “Execute Good Enough Plans.” The near universal tendency is to try for perfect plans and perfect Future Pictures; as nice as it might be to realize a perfect Future Picture, the likelihood of doing so is vanishing small while the cost will almost certainly be prohibitive.
As Afghanistan is much in the news today with senior NATO officers opining that there is no military solution and that it is necessary to talk to the Taliban, I thought it would be useful and interesting to do a strategy outline using the ideas just summarized. As the purpose of this Blog is not so much to provide answers as to illustrate strategy principles, I will try to show the range of options in each strategy area-to the extent that there are options.
Nations develop strategy for situations that concern them in some way. The greater the concern, the more important is the strategy. It is useful, then, to consider for a moment why Afghanistan is of concern to the West. Historically, its importance lay in its geographic position between east and west. In the 19th Century it became a key player in the “great game” between Russia and Great Britain where for nearly a century Britain worked hard to keep Russia away from warm water ports into the open oceans and to prevent her from standing athwart the land route to India. The importance of Afghanistan from this standpoint decreased substantially in the period between the World Wars only to reemerge as the Cold War began in the late 1940′s. Subsequently, the United States assumed the British role and actively supported uprisings against Soviet occupation in the 1980′s. For two hundred years, then, American and British interest in Afghanistan was almost exclusively confined to preventing it from falling into Russian hands. When the Soviet empire collapsed, the United States no longer had an interest in Afghanistan. It was certainly not pleased when the Taliban took power, but its displeasure was far from sufficient to suggest armed intervention. It was only after Al Qaeda used Afghanistan as a base of operations for attacks such as those of September 11 that the United States decided to go to war against the Taliban who had supported Al Qaeda. Note that the casus belli was exclusively Taliban support for Al Qaeda; in the absence of that support, the US would never have gone to war in Afghanistan regardless of how nasty the Taliban might have been to its fellow Afghanis. Our war operations led rapidly to replacement of the Taliban and destruction of the Al Qaeda organization in that country. In the intervening years, our operations initially focused on hunting for Osama Bin Laden who, along with any surviving cohorts, is most likely in the tribal areas of Pakistan. NATO now finds itself supporting the Afghan government in a civil war against the Taliban. In short, the US accomplished its objectives in 2002 when it destroyed Afghan government support for Al Qaeda. The question that needs to be addressed now is: what is our interest in Afghanistan? Is it the same interest that led us to war in the first place, or have we now decided that our mission is dramatically different and more expansive than it has ever been in the past? With this as background, we can now suggest two alternative strategies that begin with two very different Future Picture options.
Future Picture (Where?): Option 1– Afghanistan becomes a successful, democratic, secular state that does not export opium. Option 2-Afghanistan is responsible for its own internal affairs and government, but does not permit Al Qaeda or its assigns and successors to operate or use its territory as a base of operations. It is extraordinarily important to get the Future Picture right, to understand why we want it, to be certain we would like it if it happens, and to understand the costs and risks associated with it. Without a good Future Picture, every action stands by itself and produces a random path that may lead anywhere with the majority of the outcomes likely to be worse than the starting conditions.
Centers of Gravity (What?): For Option 1, it would be necessary to create a new class of leaders within the nation, wean religious leaders away from Sharia, develop an economic system that among other things replaces at least $2B in opium income (half the country’s total income), build a transportation infrastructure, convince several different tribal groups to see themselves as Afghanis instead of tribe members, lead many Afghani demographic groups to drop the xenophobia that defeated British and Russians alike, and to build an apolitical military and police force. For Option 2, key leaders must agree to stop Al Qaeda-like organizations from using Afghanistan as a base for external operations.
Time and Parallel Operations (How?): Regardless of the option, it is essential to establish a timeframe, for time is an indispensable part of strategy. No timelines, no strategy. In addition, time is money which is in short supply so the duration must be short, probably not more than a couple years from a US and NATO standpoint. Option 1 may take generations as it requires fundamental changes in the way an ancient people thinks and acts, whereas Option 2 can reasonably be attained rather quickly. We don’t normally think about working back from the future from a time viewpoint, but doing so is invaluable. It is reasonable to assign a certain amount of time and money to be involved in any project; if it is not possible to achieve a Future Picture with acceptable risk and cost in that period, it is necessary to change the Future Picture or not participate at all.
Finish with Finesse (Exit?): Exits take place when the Future Picture is realized or when plans are progressing poorly. Exit following success with Future Picture Option 2 is straight-forward and may also be for Option 1 unless too many dependencies exist. There is also, however, a need for a plan to exit if things don’t go well. After all, nothing could be less strategic than to continue pursuing something that is not working and that it prohibitively expensive. Option 2 is easier in this case, because we always have the ability to use our asymmetric force capability to check effective Al Qaeda use of Afghanistan in the event the Afghanis fail to do so. Development of exit plans in the event Option 1 does not progress well is more challenging for it requires very clear strategic measurements of progress that would be valid over a long period.
Risk: The Option 1 Future Picture is very risky in terms of probability of success as well as in costs for several reasons: it necessarily takes a very long time (perhaps generations) and the experience of past occupiers, which include many since Alexander the Great two thousand years ago, has not been peaceful or easy. In fact, the British suffered a humiliating defeat in the 1800′s as did the Russians two decades ago when both tried to rule Afghanistan’s fiercely independent tribes. The British actually gave up occupation and settled for the good enough Future Picture of just managing Afghan foreign affairs-an arrangement that worked reasonably well for both parties for nearly a half century. The risk for Option 2 is dramatically less because Afghan leaders do not have to change or compromise any of their tribal or religious beliefs and in all likelihood; their cooperation would be personally remunerative. In addition, Option 2 requires no foreign presence.
This cursory strategic review would suggest that the best course would be to end the war in return for an agreement from the Afghan government not to allow any foreign group to operate against the West from Afghanistan. Verification would be easy and deviance could be addressed with tactics ranging from increased payments to Afghanistan to air operations against strategic targets within the nation.
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You inspired me for a new blog text.
http://defense-and-freedom.blogspot.com/2008/12/development-of-strategies.html
That thing was looming around for a long time, maybe I can inspire you to add two additional considerations to your list.